An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washington by Brennan, Thomas J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 1 
2-1-1955 
An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washington 
Thomas J. Brennan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas J. Brennan, Comment, An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washington, 30 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 
36 (1955). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol30/iss1/3 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
COMMENTS
AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF LIBEL IN WASHINGTON
THOMAS J. BRENNAN
For legal writers, the law of defamation has provided one of the
fairest targets for criticism. It is an area of law which in many respects
is extremely anomalous and confused. The Washington law in this
respect is no different from that of other jurisdictions. But in reading
over the cases it seemed that, rather than criticise or discuss the prob-
lems to any great extent, it might be helpful to those concerned with
the subject to provide an outline and citations which would serve as a
starting point and guide for further research. This is the purpose of
this article.
A convenient formula has been developed for dealing with defama-
tion. It has been expressed in these words: "The publication of any
defamatory false statement hurtful to [another] gives rise to an action
for damages unless the publication is protected by some privilege."1
The elements of this formula may be grouped under five general head-
ings: I. Defamatory statements; II. Publication; III. Defenses; IV.
Damages; V. Burden of proof and functions of judge and jury.'
I. DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS.
Defamation is divided into the actions of libel and slander. The
former is defined in a general way as written or printed defamation,
the latter as spoken. There are cases, however, which do not conform
to this narrow definition. Defamation by means of pictures, statues, or
"persistent conduct," for example, is treated as libel by expanding its
definition to include "embodiment in physical form, or any other form
of communication which, because of its permanence, has the potentially
harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words."' The
1 Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REv. 35 (1936).
2 In considering the elements of defamation, the emphasis will be placed on libel,
with only incidental discussion of slander. The footnotes, infra, contain all of the Wash-
ington cases on civil libel.
3 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568. (1938). The following cases are illustrative: Peck
v. Tribune Publishing Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1908) (pictures) ; Merle v. Sociological
Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915) (motion pictures)
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differing rules which, in most jurisdictions, have been developed for the
two forms of actions make a distinction necessary. The most important
of these rules provides that an action for libel will lie without proof of
actual loss, while an action for slander requires proof of special damage.
There is the exception, however, that when a slander is "actionable
per se," proof of special damage is not required. The phrase is applied
to those defamatory words which impute a crime or loathsome disease,
or which effect the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession or calling.-
Modem statutes and decisions also include the imputation of unchastity
to a woman,5 and the Washington cases seem to have expanded the
phrase to include words which "tend to subject [the plaintiff I to hatred,
contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or to deprive him of the benefit of public
confidence or social intercourse."16
In Washington, as in several other states, the rules of slander have
been carried over to the area of libel, and the distinction must also be
made between libel per se and libel which is actionable only in the
event that special damages can be pleaded and proved., This distinc-
tion apparently resulted from confusing the necessity of proof that the
words have a tendency to defame, with that of the damage suffered as
a result. In other words, because the plaintiff must show the defamatory
character of the charge, he must also show special damage.' This is
vigorously opposed by modern writers.' As a result of the distinction,
it is safe to say that, though they are discussed separately, there are no
substantial differences in the rules of civil libel and slander as they
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 14 AtL 425 (Pa., 1888) (hanging plaintiff in effigy); Cox
v. National Loan & Exchange Bank, 138 S.C. 381, 136 S.E. 637 (1927) (dishonoring
valid check drawn on defendant bank); Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Ins. Co., 151
Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913) (following plaintiff in obvious manner, i.e., "shadow-
ing").
'Ecuyer v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 101 Wash. 247, 172 Pac. 359 (1918); 107 Wash.
411, 181 Pac. 871 (1919) ; ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 35 (6th ed. 1929).
5 PROssOR, TORTS 799 (1941).
8 Magee v. Cohn, 187 Wash. 157, 59 P2d 1131 (1936). This, of course, would in-
clude the imputation of unchastity to a woman.
7 The "doctrine" was adopted in Washington without consideration of the implica-
tions. Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash. 155, 45 Pac. 747 (1896). Some courts use the
terms "libel per se" and "libel per quod." Isham, Libel per se and Libel per quod in
Ohio, 15 OHio ST. L. J. 303 (1954). .But the latter phrase has not found its way into
the Washington cases.
8 In a few Washington cases the court seems to recognize the distinction. E.g.,
Haynes v. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co., 11 Wash. 503, 39 Pac. 969 (1895) ; Wilson v.
Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac. 774 (1915). These cases use the phrase "prima
facie libelous."
9 E.g., PRossoR, TORTS § 92 (1941) ; McCoaRmIci, DAMAGES § 113 (1935) ; Green,
Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936) ; Burke, Libel per se, 14 CAL. L. REy.
61 (1925) ; Carpenter, Defamation-Libel per se-Special Damages, 7 ORE. L. REv.
353 (1928).
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exist in Washington. In one particularly illustrative case1" a radio
station was held liable for defamatory statements broadcast over its
facilities, though the court refrained from saying whether the decision
and liability were predicted upon the rules of slander or upon those
of libel.11 As the outcome would have been the same in either case, the
determination was unnecessary.
It is generally agreed that the rules of libel and slander should be
united." That this was accomplished in Washington by applying the
rules of slander to all defamation is unfortunate, for these are rules
which contain many absurdities. For instance, in those states which do
not consider the imputation of unchastity to a woman as "actionable
per se," the rules of slander will permit a woman to recover for ridicule
of her hat, but will deny recovery if she is unmarried and called a
prostitute.' At least four proposals have been offered as a more desir-
able and logical basis on which the two might be united. 1. It has been
suggested that, in all cases, proof of actual damage should be required
as essential to the existence of a cause of action. 2. The opposite view
would make all defamation, oral or written, actionable without proof
of damage. 3. A compromise proposal would distinguish between major
and minor defamatory imputations, and, having regard to all extrinsic
facts, make only the former actionable without proof of damage. 4. As
an alternative, the extent of publication has been submitted as the basis
of distinction. 1"
Though more workable rules would be desirable, the fact remains
that the present rules in this respect are well engrafted into the Wash-
ington law. If, therefore, it is determined that the writing is not libelous
per se, it is necessary to show its defamatory nature and in addition to
10 Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
11 The question is still the subject of debate. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243
N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1098 (1932) (defamation by radio is libel); Summit Hotel Co. v.
Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302, 124 A.L.R. 968 (1939) (slander).
See Graham, Defamation and Radio, 12 WASH. L. Rav. 282 (1937) ; Leflar, Radio
and TV Defamation, 15 OHIO ST. L. J. 252 (1954). The Restatement would turn the
decision on the deliberate and premeditated character of the publication, and the per-
sistence of the defamatory conduct. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568, Comment f (1938).
In 1935 the criminal libel code was amended to include radio broadcasting. RCW
9.58.010. But this leaves open the question whether the same rules apply in a civil
action. Cf. Enright v. Bringold, 106 Wash. 233, 179 Pac. 844 (1919). The liability of
the owner or operator of a radio or television station has been limited by RCW
19.64.010 (owner or operator shall not be liable in damages for defamatory statements
if person speaking is required to submit a written script prior to the broadcast, unless
the defamatory statements are contained in the written script).
2E.g., 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568, Comment b (1938).
13 Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Ore. 242, 191 Pac. 502 (1920).
14An elaboration and citations can be found in PROSSOR, TORTS § 92 (1941). He
suggests that a combination of the latter two are most likely to be adopted generally.
[FEB.
LAW OF LIBEL IN WASHINGTON
plead and prove special damages. In making the determination, which
is a matter of law, 5 the court has said that the writing should be "read
as a whole, in its natural and obvious sense, and not extended by the
conclusions of the pleader, and the defamatory matter must be certain
and apparent from the words themselves."'" In conjunction with this
statement, a safe rule of thumb to follow is that, eliminating the statu-
tory element of malice, any defamatory writing which comes within
the criminal libel statute is considered to be libelous per se in a civil
action.17
'1 Ward v. Painters' Local Union, 41 Wn.2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953).
16 Graham v. Star Pub. Co., 133 Wash. 387, 233 Pac. 625 (1925).
17 By RCW 9.58.010, a writing, picture, effigy, sign, etc., is criminally libelous if it
tends-
"(1) To expose any living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to
deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse; or
"(2) To expose the memory of one deceased to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy; or
"(3) To injure any person, corporation, or association of persons in his or its
business or occupation. . . ."
The following are illustrative of writings considered to be libelous per se: Byrne v.
Funk, 38 Wash. 506, 80 Pac. 772 (1905) (calling public officer a "liar and poltroon") ;
Reynolds v. Holland, 46 Wash. 537, 90 Pac. 648 (1907) (newspaper article charging
that plaintiff, an attorney, charged an excessive fee for the foreclosure of a mortgage,
when the work was done by defendant's attorney); Quinn v. Review Pub. Co., 55
'Wash. 69, 104 Pac. 181 (1909) (charging city inspector of sidewalks with being part
of a system of jobbery and graft) ; Lanthrop v. Sundberg, 55 Wash. 144, 104 Pac. 176
(1909) (charge that osteopaths were "criminal practitioners, fakirs, quacks, charla-
tans and other fraudulent concerns") ; Wells. v. Times Printing Co., 77 Wash. 171,
137 Pac. 457 (1913) (charge of violation of statute defining the public desecration or
disrespect of the United States flag); Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148
Pac. 774 (1915) (charge that plaintiff's restaurant was dirty, unsanitary, poorly
ventilated, the abode of microbes, etc.); Dick v. Northern Pac. RR Co., 86 Wash.
211, 150 Pac. 8 (1915) (publication of a writing discharging employee "for intimidat-
ing company's employees"); Olympia Water Works v. Mottman, 88 Wash. 694, 153
Pac. 1074 (1915) (statements concerning a water company to the effect that the city's
drinking water came through an open ditch past China gardens, that every time it
rained "we drink drainage water"); Cyclohomo Amusement Co. v. Hayward-Larkin
Co., 93 Wash. 367, 160 Pac. 1051 (1916) (billboard posters, printed in red, stating
that plaintiff's theater could not display union card and was therefore dangerous) ;
McKillip v. Grays Harbor Pub. Co., 100 Wash. 657, 171 Pac. 1026 (1918) -(charge of
violation of statute prohibiting false reports concerning a candidate for election);
Roane v. Columbian Pub. Co., 126 Wash. 416, 218 Pac. 213 (1923) (newspaper article
criticising city councilman for an ordinance relating to dogs, characterized as an
"idiotic performance") ; Graham v. Star Pub. Co., 133 Wash. 387, 233 Pac. 625 (1925)
(charge that police officer was discharged from service for criminal offenses) ; Ten-
nant v. Whitney & Sons, 133 Wash. 581, 234 Pac. 666 (1925) '(report of plaintiff's
prosecution for unlawful possession of "booze" of which plaintiff had been acquitted
on a technicality); Hansen v. Parks, 139 Wash. 241, 246 Pac. 584 (1926) (charging
burglarious entry); Ryan v. Tribune Pub. Co., 148 Wash. 295, 268 Pac. 893 (1928)
(charging plaintiff with collusion in connection with county printing contract);
Holenbeck v. Post-Intelligencer Co., 162 Wash. 14, 297 Pac. 793 (1931) (charge that
plaintiff's rooming house was being operated as a vice den to lure young girls and ply
them with liquor); Luna de la Peunte v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P.2d
753 (1936) (false report of all night drinking party at whch plaintiff attended and
got drunk); Ziebell v. Lumberman's Printig Co., 14 Wn.2d 261, 127 P.2d 677 (1942)
(article charging public utility district officer with being a confessed tool of WallSt eet); C rey v. Hearst Publications, 19 Wn.2d 655, 143 P.2d 857 (1943) (false
report that judge had censured an attorney for falsely testifying); Arnold v. Nat'l
1955]
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II. PUBLICATION.
Since the interest protected is that of reputation, it is an essential
element that the defamation be communicated to someone other than
the person defamed." To this element is given the name "publication."
The term is not used in its technical sense as meaning written or printed,
since, as was mentioned above, a libel may be conveyed by means of
pictures, statues, or "persistent conduct." In Washington, republication
of a libel is actionable to the same extent as the original release.1
One problem in particular which has confronted the Washington
court as to what constitutes publication relates to business communica-
tions. It has been held that a defamatory communication sent by a cor-
poration from its home office to a branch office, relating to and for the
attention of its employees, is not itself a publication within the law of
libel, since the employees are not third persons in their relation to the
corporation."- A few cases from other jurisdictions have held that such
communications are qualifiedly privileged. 1 The difference is an im-
portant one, for if there is no publication, the existence of "malice" will
not serve to overcome the defense as would be the case were the com-
munication considered to be qualifiedly privileged. To say that there
is no publication is somewhat of a legal fiction of course, yet the term
"publication" is a technical one, and as such it is not surprising that
restrictions should be placed on its meaning. Other types of business
communications are considered to be qualifiedly privileged.22
III. DEFENSES.
If the defamatory nature of the alleged libel has been established,
and there has been a publication thereof, the defendant has resort to
Union, etc., 36 Wn.2d 557, 219 P.2d 121 (1950) (letter of union agent charging that
certain members were "renegades"); Yelle v. Cowles Pub. Co., 146 Wash. Dec. 98,
- P.2d- (1955) (editorial comment that certain acts of plaintiffs as state auditor
and land commissioner "must be considered by the taxpayers as an unnecessary and
culpable squandering of state funds.")
18 Prins v. Holland-North America Mortgage Co., 107 Wash. 206, 181 Pac. 680
(1919).
19 Carey v. Hearst Pub. Co., 19 Wn.2d 655, 143 P.2d 857 (1943). See Note, Libel
and Slander-Strict Liability--Press Dispatches-Defamation by Radio, 19 WASH.
L. REv. 169 (1944). Another view is to the effect that to show a good cause of action,
it must be shown that the defendant was reckless or wanton in republishng the false-
hood. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
20 Prins v. Holland-North America Mortgage Co., supra note 18. Accord, Brigs v.
Atlantic Coast Line RR Co., 66 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1933).2 1 E.g., Nichols v. Eaton, 110 Iowa 509, 81 N.W. 792 (1900) ; Bohlinger v. Ger-
mania L. Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S.W. 257 (1911).
22 As, for example, a letter by one stockholder to another relating to an officer of
the corporation. Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285, 86 Pac. 627 (1906).
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several defenses: (1) truth;2" (2) consent to the publication;2 (3) the
absolute privilege extended to legislative and judicial proceedings,2" to
proceedings of executive officers charged with responsibility of impor-
tance,2" and to communications between husband and wife;27 (4) the
qualified privilege conditioned upon good motives and reasonable be-
havior, which is extended to publications made to advance a legitimate
interest of the publisher,2" the recipient or other third person,29 to
communications between those having a common interest for the ad-
vancement of that interest," to publications made to proper persons in
the interest of the public,"' and to reports of proceedings of public
interest; 2 and, (5) fair comment or criticism."3 Of these, the first three
are absolute defenses; 4 the latter merely qualified."2 Though Washing-
23 Truth was a complete defense in the following cases: Haynes v. Spokane Chronicle
Pub. Co., 11 Wash. 503, 39 Pac. 969 (1895) (report of conduct of plaintiff's from
which it could be inferred that he committed murder, but not a direct charge) ; Leghorn
v. Review Pub. Co., 31 Wash. 627, 72 Pac. 485 (1903) (article charging plaintiff with
abstracting money from a "special postal fund" ; Ott v. Press Pub. Co., 40 Wash.
308, 82 Pac. 181 (1909) (defamatory article concerning employment agency) ; Lynch
v. Republic Pub. Co., 40 Wn.2d 379, 243 P2d 636 (1952) (article stating that plain-
tiff had repeatedly demonstrated his disqualifications as a judge). The injured party
may still be afforded a remedy in those jurisdictions which recognize a "right of
privacy." Cf. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 229 S.W. 967 (1927).
24 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 583 (1938).
22 Abbott v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 20 Wash. 552, 59 Pac. 376 (1899) (allega-
tions contained in pleadings); Miller v. Gust, 71 Wash. 139, 127 Pac. 845 (1912)(affidavit in divorce case charging adultery) ; Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wn.2d 528, 110
P.2d 190 (1941) (allegations in pleadings which were stricken as being irrelevant);
McClure v. Stretch, 20 Wn.2d 460, 147 P.2d 935 (1944) (allegations in pleadings
which were not legally sufficient) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 585-590 (1938).
26 Stivers v. Allen, 115 Wash. 136, 196 Pac. 663 (1921) (words spoken by U.S.
district attorney of one suspected of a criminal offense-slander). This category also
includes proceedings of certain administrative agencies, though some writers would
consider this as a separate classification. See Comment, Defamation--Absolute Im-
munity, 15 OHIo ST. L. J. 330 (1954).
27 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 592 (1938). A few courts hold that there is no publica-
tion; while still others say that the privilege is merely conditional. See Comment,
supra note 26.2 8 Fahey v. Shafer, 98 Wash. 517, 167 Pac. 1118 (1917) (publication to Ad club,
created for purpose of preventing questionable advertising, that "upstairs" clothiers
were attacking "street-level" clothiers in advertising charging questionable business
methods and "fake" reduction sales).
29 Kimble v. Kimble, 14 Wash. 369, 44 Pac. 866 (1896) (letter by son to his mother
warning her of danger of loss of her property rights by efforts of plaintiff).
20 Chambers v. Leiser, supra note 22; Bass v. Matthews, 69 Wash. 214, 124 Pac.
384 (1912) (church committee's report on investigation of minister); Ward v.
Painters' Local Union, 41 Wn.2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953) (report to members of
union purporting to show shortages which occurred while plaintiff was in office).
313 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 598 (1938).
22 McClure v. Review Pub. Co., 38 Wash. 160, 80 Pac. 303 (1905) (articles report-
ing acts of law officers relating to pursuit, arrest and trial of plaintiff, who was charged
with burglary).
3 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606 (1938), and cases cited infra note 50.
24 3 id. §§ 582-592.
85 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 593-598, 606. The terms "conditional" and "qualified,"
though used interchangeably, denote the same defense.
1955]
W4"ASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
ton has no apparent problems concerning the absolute defenses, the
qualified defenses are in a considerable state of confusion.
Several cases recognize the defense of qualified privilege,3 6 and at
least as many recognize that substantial truth is a complete defense in
any civil action for libel." These defenses are separate and distinct:
the essence of the qualified privilege is a defense despite falsity." Con-
fusion has been injected into the cases, however, by the unfortunate
choice of language illustrated by these statements: "The privilege ends
when falsity begins, and if, as the complaint alleges, the charge is false,
the privilege, if there was one, was therefore exceeded"; 39 or "The
article was libelous per se. If false, its publication does not fall within
the rule of qualified privilege."4 In the cases using these or similar
phrases, either a privilege never existed, or the occasion of the qualified
privilege had been destroyed by excesses; in none of them was it
necessary to consider the element of truth or falsity. Many courts have
established that the privilege is lost if the defendant does not believe
what he says; or that it is lost of the defamer does not have reasonable
grounds or "probable cause" to believe the statement or writing to be
true; or that good faith, no matter how unreasonable the basis, is all
that is required.' But the quoted statements would indicate that in
all cases the privilege is lost if the writing is false. Such a rule
would subvert the defense of qualified privilege. 2 This was not in-
tended, but it leaves the state of the law of qualified privilege extremely
uncertain, and serves as "an excellent illustration of the extent to which
uncritical use of words bedevils the law."43 The court is aware of the
36 Supra notes 28-32. "Immunity" is probably a more accurate term than "privilege."
PROSSOR, TORTS 822 (1941) ; Comment, Defaination--Absolute Immunity, 15 OHIO
ST. L. J. 330 (1954).
37 Supra note 23.
38 Fahey v. Shafer, 98 Wash. 517, 167 Pac. 1118 (1917).
39 Graham v. Star Pub. Co., 133 Wash. 387, 233 Pac. 625 (1925); Hollenbeck v.
Post-Intelligencer Co., 162 Wash. 14, 297 Pac. 793 (1931).
40 Carey v. Hearst Publications, 19 Wn.2d 655, 143 P.2d 857 (1943), citing Byrne v.
Funk, 38 Wash. 506, 80 Pac. 722 (1905). See also McKillop v. Grays Harbor Pub.
Co., 100 Wash. 657, 171 Pac. 1026 (1918).
41 PROSSOR, TORTS 850 (1941).
42 See Gaffney v. Scott Pub. Co., 35 Wn.2d 272, 212 P.2d 817 (1949) ; 41 Wn.2d
191, 248 P.2d 390 (1952), cert. denied, 73 S.Ct. 1131. The error in the first Gaffney
case was perpetrated by a strict application of the law of the case doctrine. See Com-
ment, The Law of the Case Doctrine, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 137 (1953). The brief Amici
Curiae, submitted in connection with the second appeal of the Gaffney case contains
an excellent discussion of the present confusion surrounding the defenses of truth and
qualified privilege. It also illustrates the influence that a well written brief, even when
partially in error, will have upon the court. An attempt to reconcile the cases will be
found in Holden v. American News Co., 52 Fed. Supp. 24 (E.D.Wash. 1943).
43 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54
(1943).
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problem, and has indicated that correction can be expected when the
proper occasion arises. 4
The confusion surrounding the defenses of truth and qualified privi-
lege is further complicated by the fact that only vague distinctions are
made between the defense of fair comment or criticism and that of
qualified privilege. The fault, if it can be termed a fault, is not alone
that of the court. Legal writers as well have disagreed as to whether
the defense of fair comment or criticism is regarded as a privilege or
something other than a privilege.45 Though the generic term "privilege"
is used to denote both,46 it is important to make a distinction. The
qualified privilege relates to statements of fact, while comment or
criticism is "an expression of opinion of the commentator or critic upon
the facts commented upon or criticised." 7 A much broader immunity
is conferred upon discussion of matters of public concern in the form
of expressions of opinion, but the critic or commentator is nof "privi-
leged" to express more than his- opinion. He may be liable if he mis-
states the facts, or if his opinion is based upon facts which are untrue
and are not subject to a qualified or absolute privilege. It is in this
latter connection that the distinction gains importance. This becomes
apparent in light of two differing legal philosophies covering fair com-
ment or criticism of public affairs. The minority rule, and the one
advocated by the newspaper and other public communications interests,
provides that misstatements of fact in a publication relating to public
affairs (or to a public officer in the performance of public duties, or to
a candidate for public office) made in good faith, with proper motives
and with reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, do not in
themselves destroy the defense of fair comment or criticism based upon
those facts." The traditional and more widely accepted view is that the
facts upon which the criticism is based must be true, or be shown to
4""Some of the law of libel expressed in our previous decisions should be recan-
vassed." Gaffney v. Scott Pub. Co., 41 Wn.2d 191, 248,P.2d 390 (1952). A step in this
direction is Ward v. Painters' Union, 41 Wn.2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953). But see the
contradictions in Yelle v. Cowles Pub. Co., 146 Wash. Dec. 98, -P.2d--- (1955),
an action for libel: "Defamatory words spoken of a person, which in themselves
prejudice him in his profession, trade, vocation, or office, are slanderois and actionable
per se, unless they are either true or privileged. Words spoken, however, which
are not in fact true, are iwt privileged." [Emphasis supplied.]
45 PROSSOR, TORTS 842 (1941), and material cited therein.
46 Note, 155 A.L.R. 1346 at 1348 (1943) ; 3 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 606 (1938).
47 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606, Comment b (1938).
48E.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908). See Veeder,
Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HAnv. L. REv. 413 (1910).
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fall within a qualified or absolute privilege." It seems apparent that
fair comment or criticism is a defense separate and apart from that
of qualified privilege, and that the confusion could be considerably
lessened by classifying fair comment or criticism by something other
than the appellation "privilege." Washington has been placed in the
company of both those states which have adopted the modern rule, and
those states which adhere to the older or traditional view.5" Quite valid
arguments have been advanced for either side,5 ' but there are dicta in
recent Washington cases which indicate that the court intends to adhere
to the traditional rule, and will so hold at the first opportunity.12
As an answer to the defenses of qualified privilege and fair comment
or criticism, the use of the term "malice" becomes relevant. The Wash-
ington court, without stating exactly what is meant, has repeatedly held
that a qualified privilege is lost if the publication is made "mali-
ciously."53 This leads to a certain amount of confusion, for the meaning
is threefold: (1) It has been used in the sense of spite, ill will, or a
desire to do harm for its own sake; (2) in the sense of something less
than spite or ill will; and, (3) in the sense of excessive publication.54
The term is nebulous and unsatisfactory, but if it is kept in mind that
it has taken these technical meanings, no particular harm results from
its use.
Quite apart from the use of malice as an answer to the qualified
defenses, the early law of defamation burdened the plaintiff with plead-
ing and proving malice (in the sense of spite or improper motive) in
the first instance. This was later reduced to the fiction that malice
49 This is the rule adopted in the Restatement. ".. . The facts upon which the
criticism is based must either be true or, if untrue, the critic must be privileged to
state them. In the case of a defamatory opinion expressed upon a false statement of
fact, the critic, to escape liability, must show the privileged character of the statement
of fact, and, in addition, show that the criticism or comment thereon is privileged under
the rule stated in this section." 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606, Comment c (1938).
50 That Washington is in the majority column: Notes, 110 A.L.R. 412 (1936), 150
A.L.R. 358 (1943), based on Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d
847 (1933), and Ziebell v Lumberman's Printing Co., 14 Wn.2d 261, 127 P.2d 677(1942). See also Byrne v. Funk, 38 Wash. 506, 80 Pac. 772 (1905) ; Quinn v. Review
Pub. Co., 55 Wash. 69, 104 Pac. 181 (1909) ; McKillip v. Gray's Harbor Pub. Co.,
100 Wash. 657, 171 Pac. 1025 (1918). That Washington follows the minority view:
SIEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS 331 (1934), based on State v.
Wilson, 137 Wash. 125, 241 Pac. 970 (1925) (criminal libel).
"I For a discussion, see Egan v. Dotson, 36 S.D. 459, 155 N.W. 783 (1915) ; Cole-
man v. MacLennan, supra note 48; Boyer, Fair Comment, 15 OHio ST. L. J. 280
(1954).52 E.g., Cohen v. Cowles Pub. Co., 145 Wash. Dec. 241, 273 P.2d 893 (1954).
53 E.g., Kimble v. Kimble, 14 Wash. 369, 44 Pac. 866 (1896) ; Chambers v. Leiser,
43 Wash. 285, 86 Pac. 627 (1906) ; Graham v. Star Pub. Co., 133 Wash. 387, 233 Pac.
625 (1925).
54 See Stewart v. Riley, 114 W.Va. 578, 172 S.E. 791 (1934) ; PROSsoRz, TORTS
849 (1941) ; Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REv. 35 (1936).
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would be implied by the law from an intentional publication of a
defamatory character, and it is so held in several jurisdictions. In many
cases, there is at most only thoughtlessness or negligence, rather than
any malice or intent to injure, and "implied malice" becomes a disguise
for strict liability in any case of unprivileged defamation.5 It has not
been accepted in Washington, however, and though there are occasional
dicta to the contrary, the large majority of the cases reiterate that
"9malice is not a necessary element in civil libel.""
IV. DAmAGEs.
The injury required to satisfy the element of special damages is a
pecuniary or material one.5" A further requirement is that the pleader
identify the particular loss with a definiteness which is not ordinarily
requisite in pleading damages. The lost contract, employment, sale, or
other valuable object must be identified in pleading and proof by name,
date, and place."8 But where the defamation is libelous per se, the
plaintiff can recover general damages, which will be presumed, 9 as well
as special damages if alleged and proved." The principal elements of
general damages may be listed as: (1) injury to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion; (2) the general falling off of business or patronage; (3) wounded
feelings and humiliation."' In support of the claim for general damages,
the extent of the "circulation" seems material.6 -An apology or retraction
by the defendant may greatly diminish the injury to plaintiff's reputa-
tion, and is also material.63 If the defamation relates to the plaintiff in
his business or profession, the reputation he bears in that capacity may
be shown, but only if the defendant strikes at the plaintiff's reputa-
55 For a discussion, see PROSsoR, ToRTs 816 (1941). On the question of strict lia-
bility in Washington, see Carey v. Hearst Publications, 19 Wn2d 655, 143 P.2d 857
(1943), relying on Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909). As applied to radio
owners and operators, and press dispatches, see citations in notes 11 and 19 supra.
56E.g., Ziebell v. Lumberman's Printing Co., 14 Wn.2d 261, 127 P.2d 677 (1942),
and cases cited therein. But perhaps contra in the case of slander. Stewart v. Major,
17 Wash. 238, 49 Pac. 503 (1897).
57 McComiucr, DAMAGES § 114 (1935).
58 Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass'n, 55 Wash. 331, 104 Pac. 769 (1909) (loss
of credit insufficient without specifying persons who have withdrawn credit or showing
that such specification is impossible) ; Catarau v. Sunde d'Evers Co., 188 Wash. 592,
63 P.2d 365 (1936) (loss of profits insufficient where it did not appear that the business
had been in successful operation for a period of time to give it permanence and
recognition).
59 Arnold v. Nat'l Union, etc., 44 Wn.2d 183, 265 P.2d 1051 (1954).60 Coffman v. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co., 65 Wash. 1, 117 Pac. 596 (1911) ; Dick
v. Northern Pac. RR Co., 86 Wash. 211, 150 Pac. 8 (1915).
61 McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 116 (1935), and cases cited supra note 17.
62 But this has been subjected to limitations. Id. § 117.
s Coffman v. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co., 65 Wash. 1, 117 Pac. 596 (1911).
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tion. 4 And finally, though there are contrary holdings in some jurisdic-
tions, testimony is admissible to show change in the manner of conduct
of the plaintiff's family, friends and acquaintances toward him in con-
sequence of the detraction.65
In those states which allow exemplary damages, the jury may award
them where the evidence shows that the defendant was actuated by
malice, as used in the sense of ill will or wanton indifference to the
consequences, and the burden is upon the plaintiff to show the requisite
malice regardless of any claim of qualified privilege. Where, as in
Washington, exemplary damages are not permitted, the question arises
as to whether malice is relevant in aggravation or mitigation of dam-
ages. The courts of some jurisdictions take the position that the de-
fendant's apparent ill will may heighten the humiliation or suffering
sustained by the plaintiff, and that the showing of malice or of miti-
gating good faith should come in as bearing not only on exemplary, but
also on compensatory damages.66 In the Washington cases, it is held
that evidence of the defendant's malice or good faith is immaterial on
the question of damages."
V. BURDEN OF PROOF AND FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY.
No particular problems are apparent in the Washington cases as to
the burden of proof and the functions of the judge and jury. If they
are set down in an orderly fashion, and considered as they arise, no
great difficulty is encountered. To this end, the following outline should
serve as a guide. 1. If the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law show
that the words are libelous per se, he must prove his "inducement, col-
loquium, or innuendo." In this he must satisfy the court and jury that
the words bear an actionable meaning" and, whether libelous per se or
64 Contra, Hall v. Elgin Dairy Co., 15 Wash. 542, 46 Pac. 1049 (1896). Accord,
Tennant v. Whitney & Sons, 133 Wash. 581, 234 Pac. 666 (1925) (distinguishing Hall
case).
65 Luna de la Peunte v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P.2d 753, 105 A.L.R.
932 (1936).66 McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 119 (1935).
67 Davis v. Tacoma Railway and Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904);
Woodhouse v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617, 86 Pac. 1063 (1906).
r8 See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 613 (1938).
69 In the following cases, the writings were not libelous per se, and plaintiff had
burden to show their actionable meaning: Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash. 155, 45 Pac.
747 (1896) (publication charging hotel proprietor with being a "hog" because he
would not trade at home and build up the home trade) ; Wright v. Daniel, 40 Wash.
6, 82 Pac. 139 (1905) (charge that plaintiff conducted an entertainment in a manner
that "would be a disgrace to the Comique or the worst dance hall in the city," no
explanation appearing as to the character of the places referred to) ; Woodhouse v.
Powles, 43 Wash. 617, 86 Pac. 1063 (1906) (mistaken report that plaintiff, a grocer,
was delinquent in payment of his debts, causing an association of wholesale grocers to
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otherwise, that they refer to himself.7" Where the words are actionable
only by reason of the plaintiff's special character, he must prove that
the words refer to himself in that special character.7 2. The plaintiff
must next prove that the defendant published the libel to some third
person who understood its defamatory meaning and that it was -in-
tended to be applied to the plaintiff.72 The libel itself must be produced
at the trial, or must be set out in full in the complaint.7 3. If the writing
is not libelous per se, special damages must be pleaded and proved.7"
4. The plaintiff having established his case, it is then incumbent upon
the defendant to show either that the statements were true (justifica-
tion); or to establish the existence of a privileged occasion for the pub-
lication, or a defense of fair comment or criticism. Where the words
are actionable only because written of the plaintiff in the way of his
trade or profession, the defendant may show, as an additional defense,
that such trade or profession is illegal, or is practiced in an illegal
way.75 Whether the occasion was a privileged .one, and whether *the
subject of comment or criticism was a legitimate matter of public
refuse him credit) ; Whitehouse v. Cowles, 48 Wash. 546, 93 Pac. 1086 (1908) (pub-
lication that plaintiff secured a marriage license, attempted to suppress the fact, and
could not find the bride) ; Velikanje v. Millichamp, 67 Wash. 138, 120 Pac. 876 (1912)
(letter charging that an attorney bad presented forged receipts and attempted to
collect money on them, it not being charged that he forged the receipts or knew of the
forgery); Wood. v. Star Pub. Co., 90 Wash. 85, 155 Pac. 400 (1916) (newspaper
article charging one K. was offered a bribe in connection with political job, and that
plaintiff was present, it not being charged that plaintiff had committed bribery);
General Market Co. v. Post-Intelligencer Co., 96 Wash. 575, 165 Pac. 482 (1917)
(publication that plaintiff owned quantity of cheese which was destroyed as unfit for
human consumption, it not having charged plaintiff with possession with intent to sell
in violation of statute) ; Blende v. Hearst Publications, 200 Wash. 426, 93 P.2d 733
(1939) (newspaper article to the effect that plaintiff, a physician, made incomplete
diagnosis of patient who subsequently died, it not being intimated that an earlier dis-
covery of the ailment would have saved the patient's life) ; Group Health, etc. v.
King Co. Med. Soc., 39 Wn.2d 586, 237 P,2d 737 (1951) (charge that physicians were
"unethical," the word being used in a special sense).
70 In the following cases, the action failed for failure to show that the libelous state-
ments referred to plaintiff: Dunlap v. Sundberg, 55 Wash. 609, 104 Pac. 830 (1909)
(petition to owners of building by physicians demanding the removal from the building
of osteopaths, neuropaths, autopaths, chiropractors, uptomtereists, unprofessional mas-
seurs, criminal practitioners, 'medical institutes,' advertising 'specialists,' patent medi-
cine fakers, quacks, charlatans, and other fraudulent concerns") ; Hillman v. Star Pub.
Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911) (publication of plaintiff's photograph, in-
offensive in itself, in connection with a story of her father's crime, since the photograph
did not make the article "of and concerning" the plaintiff) ; Ryan v. Hearst Publica-
tions, 3 Wn.2d 128, 100 P.2d 24 (1940) (newspaper article charging a woman with a
swindle "profitable enough to raise 16 children," it not having mentioned by name the
husband and children, who brought the action).73 Dunlap v. Sundberg, supra note 70.
72 Prins v. Holland-North America Mortgage Co., supra note 18.
73 McClure v. Review Pub. Co., 38 Wash. 160, 80 Pac. 303 (1905).
74 Discussed supra and notes 7, 57-60.
75 Lathrop v. Sundberg, 62 Wash. 136, 113 Pac. 574 (1911) (osteopath not allowed
to recover damages for libel where it appeared that he was practicing osteopathy in
violation of the law).
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concern or interest are issues of law to be determined by the court."
Of course where the facts are in dispute, the jury must decide, guided
by instructions as to the proper rules to apply. 5. If the defense is one
of absolute privilege, it is a complete bar. If it is one of qualified
privilege, or fair comment or criticism, the burden is upon the plaintiff
to reestablish his case by a showing of malice in any one of its three
technical meanings, and this must be pleaded and proved. Though the
Washington court has not decided the question, other courts, as was
mentioned above, have established that the privileged occasion may be
abused either because of the publisher's lack of good faith, or because
of his lack of belief, or because of his lack of reasonable grounds for
belief. Unless only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, it
is the province of the jury to determine whether the qualified privilege
or defense of fair comment or criticism has been abused.
VI. CONCLUSION.
An effort has been made to circumscribe an entire area of Washington
law. It must be borne in mind that this article is nothing more than
the title indicates-an outline. As such, it necessarily glosses over some
of the confusion. But this is not to say that confusion does not exist;
the law of libel is, as a matter of fact, in considerable disarray. The
fault, however, lies as much with the pleader and brief writer as with
the courts, and only by careful and intrepid efforts on the part of coun-
sel to call the attention of the courts to the difficulties can correction be
expected. This article was written in the hope that it would be of use
in these efforts.
76 Ward v. Painters' Local Union, 41 Wn.2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953) ; 145 Wash.
Dec. 497, 276 P.2d 576 (1954).
77 Ibid.
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